FREEDOM

OF THE PRESS-CONFIDENTIALITY-REPORTERS
ARE LIABLE UNDER PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE FOR
BREACH OF SOURCE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT-Cohten v.
Cowles Media Company, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).

The Fourteenth Amendment protects the freedom of the
press against arbitrary governmental interference.' Although
courts recognize the importance of a free press in a democratic
society, 2 freedom of the press is not absolute.' Courts are frequently forced to choose between two equally compelling interests: the rights of individuals and a free press.4

1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment reads, in pertinent part: "Con"
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press ..
2 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 882-83 (1963) (freedom of the press is a vehicle for public participation in the
government decision-making process and is "indispensable to the operation of a
democratic form of government"). See also Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an
Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 484-85
(1980) (The author debated "whether the values of a well-informed public and of
the press' role in providing information have been accorded independent constitutional significance by the Court." Id. Moreover, the author articulated the "broad
consensus that political speech is at the core of the [First] [A]mendment's concern."). Id.
3 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). Numerous decisions, for example, have held the press subject to laws of general applicability. See,
e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991) ("generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news"); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Publishing, 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (press
subject to copyright laws); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131,
139-40 (1969) (press subject to Sherman Antitrust and Clayton Acts); Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946) (press subject to Fair
Labor Standards Act); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1945)
(press subject to Sherman Act); Associated Press v. National Labor Relations
Board, 301 U.S. 103, 128-29 (1937) (press subject to National Labor Relations
Act).
4 Emerson, supra note 2, at 920-22, 926. Some of the competing concerns include one's reputation, fair adjudication of claims and privacy. Id. at 922-26. Two
major areas of First Amendment litigation are defamation law and protection of
confidential news sources. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. Bus. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 523 (1977). For a discussion of the competing interests of individuals and the press, see generally Vincent Blasi, The Newsman's
Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 229-30 (1971) (outlining the
results of an extensive empirical study on reporters and their attitudes on confidential sources, the subpoena controversy and qualified testimonial privilege); Alfred
Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1208
(1976) (tracking the Court's decisions in the areas of defamation and invasion of
privacy, suggesting integration of the two in determining appropriate First Amendment parameters); Harold L. Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources and Information, 24 VAND. L. REV. 667, 668 (1971) (tracking the post1970 case history of the newsmen's privilege).
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In making this choice, the United States Supreme Court has
not consistently applied one rule of law. 5 Indeed, the methodology of judicial decision-making in such cases has varied according to the underlying policy principles embraced by the Court.6
At times, the Court has emphasized the Constitution's protection
of the press as an important informational source-for the public,
thereby placing the press in a preferred position in society.7 At
other times, however, the Court has held the press subject to the
same limitations as the rest of society.8 In other cases, the Court
has refused to give either interest a preferred position and has
compromised by balancing the individual's constitutional rights
against the rights of the press. 9
5 Emerson, supra note 2, at 907-18 (analyzing several "theories of reconciliation" which have been used to balance free expression with other individual rights).
See also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 964 (1978) (illustrating how Supreme Court decisions have reflected one of
three First Amendment theories: classic model, market failure model or liberty
model).
6 Emerson, supra note 2, at 908-18.
7 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (public officials
and public figures must prove actual malice before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress from media); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1964) (public official in defamation suit must prove actual malice to
recover damages from media); Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1086,
1089 (9th Cir. 1970) (First Amendment provides newsmen a qualified privilege not
to testify at grand jury proceedings absent demonstration of compelling need for
information). See also Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 658 (1975)
(favoring special rights for press based on constitutional distinction between freedom of speech and freedom of press); Michael J. Armstrong, Comment, A Barometer
of Freedom of the Press: The Opinions of Mr. Justice White, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 157, 157-58
n.2 (1980) (newsman's privilege exempts reporters from certain legal processes).
8 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972) (press's testimonial privilege not to disclose identity of confidential source in grand jury proceeding denied). See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610-11
(1982) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting press access to minor sex-offense trial
proceedings declared unconstitutional); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169-70
(1979) (journalist in public-figure defamation case did not have absolute privilege
to prevent discovery on editorial process); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
567-68 (1978) (press not exempt from search warrants); Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849-50 (1974) (First Amendment press protection did not allow
the press direct contact interviews with prisoners, a privilege also denied to the
general public); State v.Jascalevich, 158 N.J. Super. 488, 386 A.2d 466, 470 (1978)
("[R]eporters had no special First Amendment immunity from the application of
general law or any special privilege to invade the rights and liberty of others.").
9 See, e.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979) (the Sixth
Amendment outweighed the press's First Amendment right of access to pre-trial
criminal proceedings); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-24 (1974) (press's First
Amendment rights balanced against legitimate governmental interest in prison security and safety). See also Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the
Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV.
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The tension between these competing interests arises in the
context of confidentiality agreements between reporters and
their sources.' ° Recently, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, '" the
Court confronted the conflict between the press' right to publish
lawfully obtained truthful information, and a confidential informant's right to a remedy in a breach of contract action.' 2 The Cohen Court afforded the press no special treatment and held
Cowles Media liable under the generally applicable law of promissory estoppel."S
In 1982, Dan Cohen was the public relations director for an
advertising agency handling Independent Republican Wheelock
Whitney's Minnesota gubernatorial campaign. 4 During the final
days of the campaign, Cohen approached reporters from the
Minneapolis Star and Tribune (Star Tribune) and the St. Paul
Pioneer Press Dispatch (Pioneer Press) with information concerning an opponent in the upcoming election. 15 Cohen released the documents to the reporters only upon receiving a
promise of confidentiality.' 6 The information consisted of public
815, 866-67 (1983) (criticizing the Court's ad hoc balancing test approach and recommending a more uniform approach); The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather
Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1532-33 (1974) (calling for greater protection
of the press via formulation of a general standard that takes into account the freedom of the press guarantee, instead of applying an ad hoc balancing test that varies
according to the individual circumstances).
10 See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). Claims against the press
for breach of contract due to disclosure of confidential sources are a recent development in First Amendment litigation. The first such case was addressed by the
Santa Clara Superior Court in Fries v. NBC. Mary A. Galante, Source Confidentiality
Suit Ends in Deadlock, NAT'L L.J., April 2, 1984, at col. 1. Plaintiff Fries, a police
officer, contacted KRON-TV, with some information about an internal police department dispute. Id. At trial the case ended in a deadlock, id., and the parties
eventually settled. Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on News Source Recovery For Breach of Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV.
1553, 1555 n.14 (1989). Analyzing the competing interests involved when confidentiality agreements are breached, the author proposed a standard requiring
proof of the existence and breach of a confidentiality agreement "with reckless disregard for the source's interests." Id. at 1579-80. Another commentator suggested
a two prong standard requiring proof of the existence of a confidentiality contract
and breach of that contract with malice. Jens B. Koepke, Comment, Reporter Privilege: Shield or Sword? Applying a Modified Breach of Contract Standard When a Newsperson
"Burns" a Confidential Source, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 277, 304-16 (1990).
ll 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
12 Id. at 2518.
13 Id. at 2518-19.
14 Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, 445 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
15 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516. Cohen also contacted reporters from the Associated Press and WCCO-TV. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 252.
16 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516. In a meeting with Lori Sturdevant, the reporter for
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court records concerning Marlene Johnson, the DemocraticFarmer-Labor-Party's candidate for Lieutenant Governor.' 7 The
court records revealed an unlawful assembly charge, which subsequent press investigation indicated was dismissed, and a petit
theft conviction that was later vacated.' 8 The editorial staffs of
both newspapers independently decided to divulge Cohen's
name in their stories concerning Johnson.' 9 Cohen was fired
from his job the same day the stories were published.20
Cohen instituted suit in the Minnesota trial court against
Cowles Media Company, the publishers of the Star Tribune and
the Pioneer Press, alleging breach of contract and fraudulent
misrepresentation. 2 ' A jury awarded Cohen $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages based on
the Star Tribune, and Bill Salisbury, the reporter for the Pioneer Press, Cohen
stated the following:
I have some documents which may or may not relate to a candidate in
the upcoming election, and if you will give me a promise of confidentiality, that is that I will be treated as an anonymous source, that my
name will not appear in any material in connection with this, and that
you will also agree that you're not going to pursue with me a question
of who my source is, then I will furnish you with the documents.
Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 252. Each reporter willingly and voluntarily assented to the
promise of anonymity. Id. The reporters from the Associated Press and WCCO-TV
likewise promised anonymity. Id.
17 Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2516.
18 Id. The 1969 unlawful assembly charge resulted from Johnson's participation
in a protest advocating the hiring of more minority workers for municipal construction jobs. Id. Johnson received the 1970 petit theft conviction after leaving a store
with $6.00 worth of unpaid merchandise, an incident which occurred during an
apparently emotionally tumultuous period of Johnson's life. Id.
19 Id. Several editors at the Star Tribune met amongst themselves and decided
to reveal Cohen's identity as part of their story. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 253. Reporter Sturdevant adamantly opposed the Star Tribune editors' decision to dishonor Sturdevant's confidentiality promise. Id. Sturdevant then telephoned Cohen
several times seeking to be released from her promise, each time to no avail. Id. On
October 28, 1982, the Star Tribune published its story and used Cohen's name. Id.
The Pioneer Press, however, engaged in no such extensive deliberations concerning the matter and on October 28th, over the objections of reporter Salisbury, included Cohen's name in its publication. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 251. As the United States Supreme Court noted, a defamation suit
would have been inappropriate because the material published was true. Cohen, 111
S. Ct. at 2519. Therefore, the court distinguished Cohen's case from Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Id. In Hustler, the Court held that a public
figure could recover for a false publication only upon proving "actual malice." Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). The Court defined "actual malice" as meaning "with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964).
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both claims. 2 2
A divided Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the compensatory damages award, holding that each newspaper had
breached its confidentiality contract with Cohen. 2" The appellate
court reversed the punitive damages award, however, because
Cohen had not established a fraudulent misrepresentation
claim. 2 4 The Minnesota Supreme Court, after affirming the appellate court's denial of punitive damages, reversed the compensatory damages award and denied Cohen any recovery.2 5 The
court held that a contract action was inappropriate under the circumstances and that a promissory estoppel claim was not viable
when balanced against the publishers' First Amendment rights. 2 6
22 Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 251. The trial court rejected the publisher's argument
that the First Amendment barred Cohen's suit. Id.
23 Id. at 252, 258. Specifically, the court stated:
It is apparent from these and other federal cases that news organizations cannot rely on the [F]irst [A]mendment to shield themselves
from criminal or civil liability simply because the acts giving rise to
such liability were taken while in pursuit of newsworthy information.
It is even more apparent that news organizations are not exempt from
liability when they breach contracts entered into for the very purpose
of gathering the news. The governmental interest in allowing the civil
damage award in the instant case outweighs the intrusion on press
freedom. The government has an interest in protecting the expectations of a person who freely enters into a contract in reliance on the
court's power to remedy any damage he or she might suffer should
the other party fail to perform.
Id. at 256-57.
24 Id. at 252. The court explained that a false misrepresentation claim was necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages. Id. at 260. The court further explained that a successful misrepresentation claim must relate to some past or
present fact. Id. at 259 (citing Dollar Travel Agency, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, 354
N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)). The court stated that "[s]imply because a
party in the future fails to perform does not mean that there was any misrepresentation at the time the contract was made." Id.
25 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990).
26 Id. at 203, 205. Although this agreement consisted of an offer, an acceptance
and consideration, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the parties did
not intend to create a legally binding contract, but rather looked upon the exchange of promises as a moral obligation. Id. at 202-03. The court noted that a
moral obligation alone is insufficient to create a binding contract. Id. at 203. Thus,
reasoned the court, the parties assume the risks of entering such agreements and
must rely on the good faith of the other to fulfill the obligation. Id. Furthermore,
the court determined that recovery under the theory of promissory estoppel was
also inappropriate due to its restrictive effect on the press's First Amendment
rights. Id. at 204-05. Employing a promissory estoppel analysis, the Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed that there had been a definite exchange of promises, but
was not persuaded that injustice could be prevented solely by the enforcement of
the promise. Id. at 204. In making its determination, the court weighed the First
Amendment freedom of the press against the state's interest in protecting one's
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the First Amendment implications of the case. 27 The Supreme
Court held that the generally applicable law of promissory estoppel applied equally to all citizens of Minnesota, including the
press.28

Although the press has demonstrated deep conviction in the
strength of First Amendment protections 2 9 courts have demonstrated that freedom of the press is not unlimited. 0 In Branzburg
v. Hayes,3 ' for example, the Supreme Court held that the press is
subject to laws of general applicability. 2 In Branzburg, a reporter
promise of anonymity and concluded that the former outweighed the latter in this
case. Id. at 205. The court emphasized the significance of the public's interest in
the information involved in this dispute, and recognized the chilling effect that a
contrary decision would have on public debate. Id.
27 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. 578 (1990) (mem.).
28 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518-19 (1991). The Supreme
Court, however, declined to reinstate the Minnesota trial court's award of $200,000
in compensatory damages because the award was based on grounds other than
promissory estoppel. Id. at 2519. The case was reversed and remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court for the purpose of determining damages based on promissory estoppel, the state constitution and any other applicable state law. Id. at 2520.
29 State v. Knops, 183 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Wis. 1971). Indeed, reporters have gone
to jail in defense of their position. See id. at 94; In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 263-64,
394 A.2d 330, 332 (1978).
30 See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762-63
(1985) (defamatory speech of purely private interest not protected by the First
Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (obscene, libelous or "fighting" words are unprotected speech).
31 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Marcus, supra note 9, at 827-29 (supporting a qualified
newsman's privilege in certain circumstances, after careful weighing of the appropriate criteria). For discussion of Branzburg, see Richard V. Bennett, Note, Must
Newsmen Reveal Their ConfidentialSources to GrandJuries?, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567,
580 (1972) (balancing test employed by dissenting Justice Stewart appropriately
resolved the conflict between two equally compelling interests); Comment, The
Right of the Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV.
166, 191 (1975) (advocating right of special access for the press); William S. Hurst,
Comment, Has Branzburg Buried the Underground Press?, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV
181, 191 (1973) ("Variations in the governmental interests involved and in the burdens imposed on news-gathering should be weighed as distinctions begin to come
into focus in the process of adjudication."); Thomas W. Sacco, Comment,
Branzburg, Caldwell and Pappas - A Quick Lateral Pass to Congress, 8 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 336, 347-49 (1973) (recommending that Congress pass a federal shield law
granting the press at least a limited privilege not to identify confidential sources);
Sanford V. Teplitzky & Kenneth A. Weiss, Comment, Newsmen's Privilege Two Years
After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment in Jeopardy, 49 TUL. L. REV. 417, 43738 (1971) (arguing for newsmen's testimonial privilege on the basis that it is the
public's right to know rather than the reporter's personal rights at stake).
32 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. In Branzburg, three cases were consolidated for
review. Id. at 667-69, 672, 675. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970),
involved two articles published by Branzburg, a reporter. Id. at 668. The first article described Branzburg's observations of youths making and selling hashish, and
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who was subpoenaed before a grand jury asserted a "conditional" 33 newsman's privilege.34
of them generating $5,000 within three weeks. Id. at 667-68. The publication also
contained a photograph of a pair of hands engaged in the hashish preparation process and stated that the two participants "asked for and received a promise that
their names would be changed." Id. & n. 1. Branzburg was subpoenaed and refused
to identify the individuals. Id. at 668. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that
newsmen could not refuse to testify regarding events personally witnessed. Id. at
669. The second publication recounted Branzburg's two-week comprehensive
study of drug traffickers in Frankfort, Kentucky. Id. When subpoenaed to testify
about the " 'use and sale of drugs,' " Branzburg again refused, and sought mandamus from the court of appeals. Id. at 669-70. Branzburg argued "that if he were
forced . . . to answer questions regarding the identity of informants or disclose
information given to him in confidence, his effectiveness as a reporter would be
greatly damaged." Id. at 670. The court of appeals, however, held that the First
Amendment did not include a reporters' privilege. Id.
In In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), reporter Pappas gained entry to
a Black Panther Party meeting only after agreeing "not to disclose anything he saw
or heard." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672, 674. Pappas remained inside the radical
political group's headquarters for about three hours without reporting on any of it.
Id. Two months later, Pappas responded to a grand jury subpoena with a motion to
quash, claiming a First Amendment privilege not to reveal a source's identity. Id. at
672-73. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adhered to earlier court decisions granting the public the " 'right to every man's evidence.' "Id. at 674 (quoting
In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 299 (Mass. 1971)). The Massachusetts court also
held that the First Amendment did not embody either a qualified or an absolute
newsmen's testimonial privilege. Id. (citing In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 302-03
(Mass. 1971)).
In Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), a New York Times
reporter, Caldwell, received a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to testify before
a grand jury with notes and tape recordings of his interviews concerning the goals
and activities of the Black Panther Party. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675, 679. Caldwell
moved to quash the subpoena on grounds that it violated " 'vital First Amendment
freedoms.' " Id. at 676. On December 14, 1969, the New York Times carried Caldwell's story, which included the following quotation from the Party's chief of staff:
" 'We advocate the very direct overthrow of the Government by way of force and
violence.' " Id. at 677. Other publications included such statements as "[w]e will
kill Richard Nixon." Id. The district court ordered Caldwell to testify about the
information he published, but acknowledged his First Amendment privilege not to
reveal confidential sources or information unless there was a compelling state interest which could not be satisfied by other means. Id. at 677-78. Following the expiration of the grand jury term, a second grand jury was empanelled and Caldwell
was again subpoenaed. Id. at 678. Caldwell's second refusal to testify led to a contempt order against him. Id. The court of appeals reversed the order, recognizing a
reporter's qualified testimonial privilege. Id. at 679. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Id.
33 Id. at 702. Although the press in each instance asserted a qualified, rather
than an absolute, privilege, the Court refused to proceed upon such a "slippery
slope." Id. at 703. The Court pointed out that freedom of the press applied to all
forms of communications, including researchers, lecturers and novelists, and
noted the problem of a subjective standard inherent in a qualified news-gathering
privilege. Id. at 703-05.
34 Id. at 680.
The press refused to disclose the identity of its confidential
sources unless it was established that: i) the reporter had information relevant to
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Justice White, writing for the Court, articulated several printhe crime being investigated by the grand jury; ii) the information could not be
obtained from any other source; and iii) there was a compelling need for the information. Id. The press relied on earlier cases, each of which presented a different
proposition supporting the press's position. Id. First, the press relied on cases emphasizing the importance of the press's role in informing the public and encouraging society's active participation in the government process. Id. In Grosjean v.
American Press Co., the Court stressed the press's "vital role as a source of public
information," specifically stating:
The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is
safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public
and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of
publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all
restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of
the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise
than with grave concern.... A free press stands as one of the great
interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to
be fettered is to fetter ourselves.
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964), the Court similarly recognized that "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id.
See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 691, 713 (1931) (stating that the Freedom of
Press Clause was created to prevent prior restraints and censorship, particularly
with regard to publications consisting of "charges against public officers of official
dereliction").
Other case law supporting the press's claims asserted that any state action infringing First Amendment freedoms must serve a compelling state interest.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (Virginia's interest in regulating the legal profession is not "compelling" enough to
justify limitation on the N.A.A.C.P.'s First Amendment freedoms of expression and
association); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (Alabama failed to
provide "controlling justification" to justify its imposition on defendant's First
Amendment freedom of association). The Court in Branzburg, however, determined that the present interest in the prosecution of crimes was a compelling "fundamental governmental role securing the safety of the person and property of the
citizen." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 700.
The third doctrine supporting the reporter's argument is that the means invoked to achieve the government's objective must be narrowly tailored, avoiding
unnecessary abridgement of First Amendment freedoms. Id. at 680-81. See Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-49 (1943) (holding unconstitutional a municipal ordinance forbidding persons to knock on doors to distribute pamphlets
and circulars, and declaring the ordinance a blanket restriction of idea dissemination); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1965) (Maryland statute requiring censorship of certain films declared unconstitutional because of its overbroad,
"sweeping and improper application"). In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, the Court held
that state regulation of constitutionally protected guarantees "may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 463-64 (1958)). The Court added that even a substantial government
interest cannot be furthered by "means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Id. at 307-08 (quoting
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
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ciples concerning the press's First Amendment guarantees.3 5
First, the Court stated that there was neither a constitutional nor
a common-law basis for granting a newsman's testimonial privilege.3 6 Instead, the Court stated that the press was subject to
laws of general applicability.3 7 Therefore, the Court held that
the press,just as any other citizen3 8 or informant,3 9 must respond
to grand jury subpoenas and answer questions relevant to crimi35
36

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682-84.
Id. at 689-90. Specifically, the Court stated:

Until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is
rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. We are asked to create another
by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial
privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do.
Id. at 690. The Court relied on several common law cases in refusing to grant such
a privilege. See, e.g, In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573, 577 (N. D. Cal.
1970) (reporters denied privilege to withhold informants' names at grand jury investigation concerning allegations of schemes to overthrow the U.S. Government);
People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 199 N.E. 415 (N.Y. 1936)
(reporter's privilege denied in refusing to testify at grand jury criminal investigation of gambling and lottery allegations); Ex parte Lawrence, 48 P. 124, 125 (Cal.
1897) (reporters had no privilege not to reveal source names of a published report
alleging state senators had taken bribes in relation to the passage of a bill). The
Court relied on the foregoing line of cases, although it mentioned a few recent
cases that have recognized a limited newsmen's privilege. See State v. Knops, 183
N.W.2d 93, 95, 98-99 (Wis. 1971) (investigation of the individuals responsible for
bombing building which killed one student and injured others). Although the
Court in Knops recognized the press's constitutional privilege not to disclose a
source's identity, it stated that "when such confidence is in conflict with the public's
overriding need to know, it must yield to the interest of justice." Id. at 99. See also
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1086-89 (9th Cir. 1970) (granting newsman's testimonial privilege under First Amendment).
In addition, several commentators have expressed their disfavor for granting a
newsman's privilege. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690 n.29; see also 8 John H. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Zechariah Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J.
607 (1943).
37 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682-83 (citing Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103,
132-33 (1937)). The Court pointed to other cases wherein the press was subject to
laws of general applicability. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Company v. United States,
394 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1969) (press subject to anti-trust regulations of Sherman Act
and Clayton Act); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93
(1946) (Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to the press and did
not act as a restraint on expression); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
12-13 (1945) (Associated Press's practices of restraining and hindering sale of interstate news to competitors held violative of Sherman Act); Associated Press v.
National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103, 128-29 (1937) (press's engagement
in interstate commerce of newsworthy information subjected it to the National Labor Relations Act).
38 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
39 Id. at 698.
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nal investigations. 4" The Court was not persuaded that this requirement would significantly impair the flow of information to
the public. 4 ' Consequently, the Court stated that the public interest in law enforcement and grand jury proceedings outweighed any First Amendment newsgathering privilege of the
press.4 2
40 Id. at 682. The Court stated that grand jury proceedings seek to uncover and
investigate sources of criminal behavior not simply to restrain the press. Id. at 691.
The Court posited that only where a news source or a reporter himself is implicated
in a crime or possesses relevant information will a reporter be subpoenaed. Id. The
Court continued, stating that:
[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news
gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other
citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a
valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial. [No First Amendment
right] confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to
violate valid criminal laws.... Private restraints on the flow of information are not so favored by the First Amendment that they override
all other public interests.
Id. at 690-91, 697. The Court reasoned that a source's preference for anonymity
under such circumstances is due to one's "desire to escape criminal prosecution."
Id. at 691. Thus, the Court concluded that "we cannot seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a newsman's agreement to conceal the
criminal conduct of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to
write about crime than to do something about it." Id. at 692.
41 Id. at 693. Although the Court acknowledged the press's concerns on this
issue, the Court "remain[ed] unclear how often and to what extent informers are
actually deterred from furnishing information when newsmen are forced to testify
before a grand jury." Id. Although the Court acknowledged the press's heavy reliance on confidential sources for its information, it nevertheless stated:
[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant
constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms
the prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen.... Reliance by the press on confidential
informants does not mean that all such sources will in fact dry up because of the later possible appearance of the newsman before a grand
jury .... [Qjuite often, such informants are members of a minority
political or cultural group that relies heavily on the media to propagate its views, publicize its aims, and magnify its exposure to the public. Moreover, grand juries characteristically conduct secret
proceedings, and law enforcement officers are themselves experienced in dealing with informers, and have their own methods for protecting them without interference with the effective administration of
justice.
Id. at 693-95.
42 Id. at 691-92. The Court articulated the grand jury process's dual role of
determining whether there was probable cause to support a criminal indictment,
and of protecting citizens against unwarranted criminal prosecutions. Id. at 686-87.
Moreover, the Court pointed out that, historically, the concealment of information
relative to criminal conduct has been discouraged. Id. at 696. In short, the Court
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Next, the Branzburg Court noted that the press may not have
to information that is not generally available to the pubaccess
lic. 43 The Court emphasized the necessity to distinguish between
the right to speak and publish versus the right to gather informafree
tion. 44 Finally, the Court articulated that the press was not 45
to publish anything at will without being subject to liability.
Two years later, in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,46 the press
asserted a First Amendment right to access information.4 7 In
Saxbe, the Washington Post alleged that the Federal Bureau of
Prisons regulation prohibiting the press from conducting personal interviews with individual prisoners violated the First
Amendment freedom of press guarantees.4 8 Justice Stewart,
embraced the prevailing view that the press may not publish anything it chooses,
without liability. Id. at 683.
43 Id. at 684-85. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Zemel, all United
States citizens were required to receive special permission from the Secretary of
State to travel to Cuba because of a break in consular and diplomatic relations between the two countries. Id. at 3. The plaintiff's request for a tourist visa was denied. Id. at 3-4. The Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the travel ban
infringed upon his First Amendment right to gather information, stating that "[t]he
right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information." Id. at 16-17. See also New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
728-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (international diplomacy and national security interests require a certain amount of confidentiality and secrecy); see infra
notes 46-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
44 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). The
Court stated, for example, that: " 'the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the
White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might
find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not
make entry into the White House a First Amendment right.' " Id. at 684 n.22 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
45 Id. at 683; see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 146-47 (1967)
(holding that the press, like other institutions performing a public service, must pay
the price for attacks on personal reputation).
46 417 U.S. 843 (1974). For a discussion on Saxbe, see Recent Developments, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 446, 458 (1975) (examining how the Court focused on the lack of
a constitutional newsgathering right, while completely ignoring the public's right to
know); Gary S. Mobley, Comment, Bans on Interviews of Prisoners: Prisoner and Press
Rights After Pell and Saxbe, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 718, 731, 733 (1975) (arguing for a
special press right of access based on the press's function "as the predominant
gatherer and disseminator of information in modern society" and the public's right
to know).
47 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844-45.
48 Id. at 844. Paragraph 4b(6) of Policy Statement 1220.1A stated:
Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates. This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or seeks
an interview. However, conversation may be permitted with inmates
whose identity is not to be made public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, programs and activities.
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writing for the Court, determined that the regulation applied
evenhandedly to all prospective visitors, including the press, who
had no personal or professional relationship with the inmates. 49
Justice Stewart opined that a balancing of First Amendment
rights against penal considerations 50 was unnecessary because
the limitation imposed on the press was merely a particularized
application of a general law. 5 ' Moreover, the Justice emphasized
that the Constitution did not require the government to provide
journalists with information not available to the general public.52
Therefore, the Court held that, because the prison regulation did
not single 3out the press, no First Amendment freedoms were
5
infringed.

Id. at 844 n. 1. In March, 1972, reporters of the Washington Post were denied interviews with specific inmates at federal prisons in Danbury, Connecticut and Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Id. at 844-45.
For a discussion of press interviews with prisoners, see Paul A. Freund, The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 169 (1974) (criticizing the Court's
complete deferral to prison officials' determinations which resulted in its "abrogation of the usual standard for evaluating [F]irst [A]mendment claims").
49 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 846. Among the privileged were clergy, family members
and inmates' attorneys. Id. Aside from the ban on face-to-face interviews, the press
members enjoyed other forms of access, such as the right to tour and photograph
the facility. Id. at 847. Additionally, reporters were permitted to briefly question
any inmates encountered during such tours. Id. Unlimited, written correspondence
with inmates was also permitted. Id. Prison officials were also required to assist the
press in investigating any inmate complaints. Id. at 847-48. Randomly selected
groups of inmates were also available for press interviews, as were recently discharged prisoners. Id. at 848.
50 Id. at 849. One of the penal considerations in running an orderly institution
includes the equal treatment of prisoners. Id. The Court recognized the tendency
of reporters to single out a few prisoners for interviews, thereby creating prison
leaders. Id. at 848. The Court deferred to the prison officials' "expert and professional judgment" concerning the problems that would ensue from such inequality
among the prisoners. Id. at 848-49.
51 Id. at 849.
52 Id. at 850 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974)). In Pell, the
Court was faced with a similar prison regulation denying the media face-to-face
inmate interviews. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 819 (1974). The inmate plaintiffs alleged freedom of speech violations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 820-21. The press plaintiffs asserted a First Amendment
newsgathering right. Id. at 821. In rejecting both claims, the Court focused on the
penal goals of security and rehabilitation, the availability of alternate means of communication, the neutrality of the regulation's application, and the lack of a press
"constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public
generally." Id. at 833.
53 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. In dissent, Justice Powell criticized the majority for its
broad restriction on access to information. Id. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell distinguished the two primary cases relied on by the majority. Id. at 85760 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Justice first noted that Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965), dealt with " 'an inhibition of action rather than a restraint of speech.' " Id.
at 858 (Powell, J., dissenting). Second, although the Court in Branzburg rejected a
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Following the decision in Saxbe, the Court again held the
press subject to laws of general applicability in Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting.54 In Zacchini, the petitioner brought suit
against a local broadcasting station after the station filmed and
televised his unique "human cannonball" act.55 Although posinewsgathering privilege in the context of grand jury proceedings, the Justice observed that, under different circumstances, such a privilege was proper. Id. at 859
(Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Powell argued that Branzburg did not stand
for a blanket prohibition on newsgathering protection. Id. In contrast to the majority's narrow focus on the equal treatment of the press and individuals under the
First Amendment, Justice Powell also weighed the competing interest of the public's right to know, emphasizing the press's societal role as an informer. Id. at 861,
863 (Powell, J., dissenting). Finally, the Justice rejected the prison's "big wheel"
theory as justification for the blanket ban on face-to-face interviews. Id. at 866, 868
(Powell, J., dissenting). In short, Justice Powell agreed with the district court in
recommending a case-by-case approach to interview requests weighing fully all of
the competing concerns. Id. at 870 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The United States District Court had emphasized that prisons, as public institutions, are a "matter of obvious public interest." Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770, 771 (D.D.C. 1972). Furthermore, the court stated that
"'[a] prisoner does not shed his First Amendment rights at the prison portals.' " Id.
at 772 (quoting Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1230 (4th Cir. 1971)). Thus,
although the Court recognized the safety and disciplinary concerns of the Federal
Prison Bureau, it concluded that the blanket prohibition on press interviews was
unjustifiably restrictive. Id. at 773. Any restrictions on one's First Amendment freedoms, reasoned the court, must be narrowly tailored. Id. at 773-74. Moreover, the
court noted that other penal institutions, such as ones located in New York City,
permit press interviews, and suggested that interviews be granted on a case-by-case
basis, according to the administrative and disciplinary factors in each instance. Id. at
774-75. For further analysis ofJustice Powell's dissent, see Lillian R. BeVier,Justice
Powell and the First Amendment's "Societal Function ": A Preliminary Analysis, 68 VA. L.
REV. 177, 184 (1982) (contrasting the majority's emphasis on First Amendment
individual rights versus Justice Powell's emphasis on the press's societal function of
informing the public).
54 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
55 Id. at 563-64. Zacchini's fifteen-second act, which he was performing at a
county fair, consisted of him being fired from a cannon into a net about 200 feet
away. Id. at 563. Zacchini's act originated in his family several generations earlier
and was one he had devoted his lifetime to mastering and performing. Id. at 564.
Zacchini had noticed the reporter in the crowd the previous day and had asked him
not to film the performance. Id. In spite of Zacchini's request, however, the reporter returned unnoticed the following day to film the act, which was broadcast
that evening. Id. For further discussion on Zacchini, see The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 208 (1977) (agreeing with dissenting Justice Powell's test
focusing on the use of the film as a more appropriate means of balancing the public's right to know against an individual's right of publicity); Douglas G. Baird,
Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1209 (1978) (recommending a fair-use
test similar to that of copyright law, that would give First Amendment protection to
the broadcast of performances when there is no better means of expression available); Phyllis Glass, Note, State "Copyright" Protection For Performers: The First Amendment Question, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1198, 1227-29 (1978) (recommending a balancing test
of "the public interest served by the unauthorized broadcast of a protected work
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tive comments accompanied the broadcast, the petitioner alleged
that the telecast represented an impermissible appropriation of
his right of publicity in the act. 5 6 Conversely, the broadcasting

company claimed that its role in informing society on matters of
public concern afforded it a First Amendment
privilege to broad57
act.
the
of
portions
all
or
any
cast
Reversing the Ohio Supreme Court decision, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the First Amendment did
not protect the media when they televise a performer's entire
performance absent the performer's consent. 58 The Court characterized the state's interest in the right of publicity as one of
protecting an individual's proprietary interest in his act, thereby
encouraging entertainment.59 Moreover, the Court analogized
against the economic interest of the performer" instead of the Court's "entire-act"
test); Edward C. Nucci, Note, Invasion of Privacy and the First Amendment. Zacchini
Makes the Press Pay, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 561, 574-75 (1978) (arguing that the public
is the ultimate loser as a result of the Court's decision because Zacchini's act was
newsworthy material that should have been afforded First Amendment protection).
56 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 564. The Ohio trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. Id. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the First
Amendment did not entitle the media to air the entire act without compensating
Zacchini for economic injuries he sustained. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged Zacchini's right of publicity on two grounds. Id. at 565. First, the court recognized that one may not use the name or likeness of another for one's own
benefit. Id. Second, the court found an appropriation of Zacchini's right of publicity in his performance. Id. These findings notwithstanding, the court held that the
defendant's broadcast fell within the First Amendment's generally protected category pertaining to matters of public concern and interest and upheld the press's
editorial privilege. Id. at 569-70.
57 Id. at 569.
58 Id. at 575.
59 Id. at 573. The Court distinguished this interest from the privacy interest in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), relied upon by the Ohio Supreme Court.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 570-73. Time involved a right of privacy claim against Time
Magazine for falsely portraying the plaintiff and his family as the subject of a newlyreleased play. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 377 (1967). The Court in Time
noted the Court of Appeals assertion that " '[t]he factual reporting of newsworthy
persons and events is in the public interest and is protected.' " Id. at 383 (citation
omitted). The Ohio Supreme Court analogized Zacchini to Time and concluded
that: "Just as the press was held to be privileged to report matters which would
otherwise be private, if they are of public concern, so too, it must be held privileged
when an individual seeks to publicly exploit his talents while keeping the benefits
private." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 461
(Ohio 1976). The United States Supreme Court, however, distinguished the claims
of "false light" (privacy) and right of publicity. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 571-77. The
Court stated that the "false light" cases seek to "minimize publication of the damaging matter, while in 'right of publicity' cases the only question is who gets to do
the publishing." Id. at 573. The Court emphasized that Zacchini did not seek to
stop publication of his act, but rather sought to be compensated for its broadcast.
Id. at 573-74.
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the right of publicity to that of copyright protection stating that
both rights allowed individuals to reap the rewards of their endeavors.6" The two most influential factors in the Court's decision were the media's broadcast of the petitioner's entire act 6 '

and the petitioner's dependence on his performance's economic
value for his livelihood.62 Although the Court acknowledged that
both entertainment and news received First Amendment protection,63 Justice White nonetheless opined that prohibiting the
broadcast would not limit the benefit of the petitioner's perform64
ance if petitioner's economic interest was duly protected.
60 Id. at 573, 575. Specifically, the Court stated: "[T]he Constitution no more
prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner." Id. at
575. The Court relied on the following cases for that principle: Ettore v. Philco
Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 490 (3d Cir. 1956) (the broadcast of
portions of a prize fight without fighter's consent actionable under state law of unfair competition); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp.
490, 492 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (unauthorized broadcast of baseball games constituted
"unfair competition and [was] a violation of the property rights of the plaintiffs");
Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911) (holding that the unauthorized public exhibition of motion pictures constituted copyright infringement). By
contrast, the Court distinguished three cases that did not "involve an alleged appropriation by the press of a right of publicity existing under state law." Zacchini,
433 U.S. at 574; see Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (New York
Times standard of actual malice not extended to private plaintiff's suit in defamation); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (private plaintiff
suing licensed radio station for defamatory statements regarding matter of public
concern must meet actual malice standard); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (public figure must prove actual malice in libel action). The
Court articulated that underlying both state interests was the rationale of providing
individuals the "economic incentive for him to make the investment required to
produce a performance of interest to the public." Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
61 Id. at 575. Specifically, the Court stated: "Much of its economic value lies in
the right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his performance; if the
public can see the act free on television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the
fair." Id. In essence, continued the Court, the rationale for protecting one's right
of publicity lies in preventing unjust enrichment. Id. at 576.
62 Id. The Court noted that the right of publicity law protected against "the
appropriation of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation
in the first place." Id. The Court emphasized that Zacchini was not suing to enjoin
the broadcasting of his act, nor was the Court interested in punishing the press for
its broadcast. Rather, Zacchini sought compensation for the broadcast. Id. at 578.
63 Id.
64 Id. The Court focused on the right of publicity, which sufficed to substantiate
its holding. Id. The Court did not attempt to delineate First Amendment parameters. Id. at 575.
In dissent, Justice Powell criticized the majority for basing its holding on the
injury caused by broadcasting the petitioner's entire act. Id. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell instead focused on the press's role as informant and feared
that the majority's decision could lead to self-censorship. Id. at 580 (Powell, J., dis-
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Although the foregoing cases appear to classify freedom of
the press as a qualified right, there are instances where the Court
has deemed an asserted state interest insufficient to justify infringement of that right. 65 In Landmark Communications v. Virginia,66 for example, the Court declared unconstitutional a
Virginia statute that prohibited the public disclosure of a state
judicial review commission's confidential proceedings. 67 Chief
senting). Such restrictions discourage press coverage of public events, reasoned
Justice Powell, and "[t]he public is. . . the loser." Id. at 581 (Powell,J., dissenting).
Justice Powell posited that the dispositive issue was the use to which the film was
put. Id. The Justice observed that petitioner's act was aired as "a routine portion of
a regular news program." Id. Justice Powell continued by distinguishing the present misappropriation suit from privacy suits. Id. at 581-82 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Justice remarked that privacy actions generally seek to avoid publicity altogether, whereas in the present case, petitioner welcomes the publicity and merely
seeks compensation for the broadcast. Id. at 582 (Powell, J., dissenting). In sum,
because petitioner's act was newsworthy, Justice Powell held its broadcast privileged under the First Amendment. Id.
In dissent, Justice Stevens was not convinced that the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision was based on adequate federal grounds to establish federal jurisdiction. Id.
at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice Stevens proposed remanding
the case back to the state court for "a clarification of its holding before deciding the
federal constitutional issue." Id.
65 Emerson, supra note 2, at 920-28 (discussing two common opposing interests:
reputation and privacy).
66 435 U.S. 829 (1978). For a discussion of Landmark, see Douglas 0. Linder,
When Names Are Not News, They're Negligence: Media Liabilityfor PersonalInjuries Resulting From the Publication of Accurate Information, 52 UMKC L. REV. 421, 439-41 (1984)
(recommending the application of a combined approach of weighing the state interest and granting the press a qualified privilege in cases involving the publication
of truthful information); Christopher P. Wells, Comment, Confidentiality Statutes and
the First Amendment: A Landmark Opinion?, 31 Fed. Comm. L.J., 85, 110, 116 (1978)
(analyzing how the Court's decision in Landmark failed to establish concrete boundaries of the press's and the individual's First Amendment rights, thereby leaving
future courts with little guidance in resolving this conflict).
67 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 833-34. The statute provided in pertinent part:
All papers filed with and proceedings before the Commission, and
under the two preceding sections (§§ 2.1-37.11, 2.1-37.12), including
the identification of the subject judge as well as all testimony and
other evidence and any transcript thereof made by a reporter, shall be
confidential and shall not be divulged by any person to anyone except
the Commission, except that the record of any proceeding filed with
Any perthe Supreme Court shall lose its confidential character ....
son who shall divulge information in violation of the provisions of this
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 831 n. 1 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13 (Michie 1973)). In Landmark, the
Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission was investigating the conduct of a
state judge. Id. at 831. A Landmark newspaper, the Virginian Pilot, disclosed the
judge's identity and reported that no formal charges had yet been filed against the
judge. Id. Shortly thereafter, Landmark, the editor, was indicted for violation of
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13. Id. Landmark testified at trial that he interpreted the
statute to restrict only participants, and argued that the First and Fourteenth
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Justice Burger, writing for the Court, recognized the need for
confidentiality in judicial inquiry and review proceedings. 68 The
Chief Justice opined, however, that the imposition of criminal
sanctions upon innocent third parties unduly burdened First
Amendment guarantees.6 9 Chief'Justice Burger asserted that the
First Amendment's primary purpose was to protect uninhibited
discussion of governmental matters.7" The Chief Justice opined
that the operations of the courts and conduct ofjudges fell within
this category and qualified as "matters of utmost public concern." 7 1 Moreover, the Court determined that the state's interAmendments allowed him, a third party non-participant, to publish the proceedings. Id. at 832.
68 Id. at 835. The Court noted several purposes in keeping judicial review commission proceedings confidential. Id. First, the Court posited that confidentiality
encouraged complaint filing and judges' cooperation. Id. Second, the Court noted
that the integrity of the judicial system and of the judges would be protected from
injury resulting from the publication of premature, unwarranted and/or false allegations. Id. In addition, the Court articulated:
When removal or retirement is justified by the charges, judges are
more likely to resign voluntarily or retire without the necessity of a
formal proceeding if the publicity that would accompany such a proceeding can thereby be avoided .... In the more common situation,
where the alleged misconduct is not of the magnitude to warrant removal or even censure, the confidentiality of the proceedings allows
the judge to be made aware of minor complaints which may appropriately be called to his attention without public notice.
Id. at 835-36.
69 Id. at 838. Landmark Communications argued that truthful reporting on the
public officials' conduct was guaranteed protection under the First Amendment. Id.
The Court stipulated that, although such speech may not always be protected, the
state's competing confidentiality interest in the instant case was insufficient to
abridge First Amendment protection. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65
(1976) (per curiam)). In Buckley, the Court "recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights . . .cannot be justified by a mere showing of
some legitimate state interest .... [W]e have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny" and be substantially related to
achievement of the State's goal. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per
curiam).
70 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 838. ChiefJustice Burger noted: "Whatever differences
may exist about interpretation of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs." Id.(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966)); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(" 'Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, [the Framers]
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed.' ").
71 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 839. The Court observed:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration .... Its function in this regard is
documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries.
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
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est in preserving the reputation of its judicial members 72 and the
integrity of its courts was inadequate to prevent the publication
of lawfully-obtained truthful information.73
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Id. (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)). Moreover, in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975), the Court noted: "With
respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to
guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public
scrutiny upon the administration of justice." Id.
72 Id. at 841. The Court noted "that injury to official reputation is an insufficient
reason 'for repressing speech that would otherwise be free.' " Id. at 841-42 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964)). The Court also
relied on Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). Id. In Garrison, a District Attorney in Louisiana publicly reprimanded and made derogatory statements about the
eight Criminal District Court judges in his jurisdiction. Id. at 64-65. The District
Attorney accused the judges of being lazy and "vacation-minded," and blamed the
backlog of cases on their inefficiency. Id. at 66. As a result, the District Attorney
was convicted of violating the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute. Id. at 65.
The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction, rejecting the District Attorney's First Amendment freedom of speech claims. Id. at 67. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, noting that while this was a criminal and not a civil case,
the New York Times "actual malice" standard applied with equal force. Id. at 67, 74.
The Court articulated that the statement concerned official conduct of public officials. Id. at 76. Moreover, the Garrison Court continued, "[tihe New York Times rule
is not rendered inapplicable merely because an official's private reputation, as well
as his public reputation, is harmed. The public-official rule protects the paramount
public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants." Id. at 77.
73 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 841. The Court disagreed with the lower court's reliance on Cox Broadcasting, which held that the First Amendment protected the truthful publication of information already in the public domain. Id. at 840. In Cox
Broadcasting,a reporter obtained a rape victim's name from public court records and
published it in violation of a statute forbidding the disclosure of such information.
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975). Based on the decision in
Cox Broadcasting, the defendant, Commonwealth of Virginia, argued that publication
of information "which by Constitutional mandate is to be confidential" was not
protected by the First Amendment. Landmark, 435 U.S. at 840 (quoting Appellee
Brief at 17). The Landmark Court, however, held that the Court in Cox Broadcasting
never addressed the issue of "whether the publication of truthful information withheld by law from the public is similarly privileged" and, therefore, refused to extend the Cox Broadcasting holding to the facts of the present case. Id. The Court
conceded that the state's interest in confidentiality was a legitimate concern, but
that it did not warrant the imposition of criminal sanctions for the publication of
truthful information and was insufficient to justify any First Amendment infringement. Id. at 841.
The Court suggested that less restrictive means of protecting judicial confidences were available. Id. at 843. For instance, the Court pointed out that several
states had implemented internal safeguards to maintain the confidentiality of Commission proceedings. Id. at 845. The Court noted that Florida, Minnesota, New
Mexico and Pennsylvania required all participants to a proceeding to take an oath
of secrecy, the violation of which leads to contempt, while Kentucky and Massachusetts have similar regulations. Id. at 841 n.12; see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
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The Court again evidenced its disdain for state statutes
prohibiting the publication of lawfully-obtained, truthful information in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.74 In Smith, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a West Virginia statute
prohibiting the publication of a juvenile offender's name absent
court permission.75 The Court declared that punishing the pub252, 270-71 (1941) (Court reasoned that free speech on public matters was essential for public faith and knowledge, whereas silence bred contempt and suspicion).
In closing, the Court rejected the clear and present danger test relied upon by
the Virginia Supreme Court. Landmark, 435 U.S. at 842. The Virginia Supreme
Court had concluded that: " 'What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.' "
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 233 S.E.2d 120, 125 (Va.
1977) (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941)). The Virginia
Supreme Court added that "actual facts" were necessary to prove the "clear and
present danger to the orderly administration of justice." Id. Although no specific
facts were presented in the present case, the court stated that:
The sanction imposed springs from a clear and well-defined legislative declaration that breach of the confidentiality of Commission proceedings is so contrary to the public interest that it constitutes a
substantive evil of immediate and serious peril to the orderly administration of justice, and, therefore, should be punishable.
Id. at 127. This matter, noted the court, involved a "serious and substantive evil...
[whereby] courtroom evidence is unnecessary to sustain their truth and validity."
Id. at 127-28. For further discussion of the clear and present danger test, see Wells,
Comment, supra note 66, at 104-06 (agreeing with the Court's rejection of the clear
and present danger test).
The United States Supreme Court, however, was not convinced that a legislative declaration alone sufficed to abridge First Amendment rights. Landmark, 435
U.S. at 843. Otherwise, continued the Court, "the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative power would be nullified." Id. at 844. In concurrence, Justice Stewart stated that "[t]here could hardly be a higher governmental
interest than a State's interest in the quality of its judiciary," and asserted that all
those who violated the confidentiality requirement should be punished. Id. at 84849 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, however, emphasized that once the
information had fallen into the hands of the press, its publication could not be
punished or prohibited. Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, the Justice implied that steps to maintain confidentiality must be taken before the press gains
access to information. Id.
74 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
75 Id. at 98-99. The West Virginia statute stated, in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall the name of any child, in connection with any proceedings under this chapter, be published in any newspaper without a written order of the court .... A person who violates . . . a provision of
this chapter ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ......
Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-3, 49-7-20 (1976)). Respondents first
learned of the newsworthy events over a police radio transmission. Id. at 99. The
incident involved the shooting of a 15-year-old student at a small suburban high
school. Id. The name of the alleged offender, a 14-year-old classmate, was obtained
through questioning various witnesses, police and others present at the scene of
the crime. Id. The following day, both the Charleston Daily Mail and the Charles-
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lication of truthful information seldom could be constitutional, 76
and that a state interest of the "highest order" was necessary to
sustain the validity of a statute levying such punishment. 7 The
Court concluded that the state's interest in keeping the name
confidential 7s did not validate the statute's imposition of criminal
sanctions.7 9 Moreover, the Court asserted that the statute, which
punished only newspapers, was underinclusive, and that altematon Gazette had published the name of the juvenile offender. Id. at 99-100. Both
before and after the juvenile's name appeared in print, the name was broadcast
over several radio stations. Id. at 99. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
concluded that the West Virginia statute operated as a prior restraint on the press
and was not justified by a sufficiently compelling state interest. Id. at 100. The West
Virginia court relied heavily on Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430
U.S. 308 (1977), where an Oklahoma statute providing for closed juvenile proceedings, and allowing access to such records only upon receipt of court permission,
was declared an unconstitutional prior restraint. State ex rel. Daily Mail Publishing
Co. v. Smith, 248 S.E.2d 269, 272 (W. Va. 1978). For additional discussion of media liability in similar cases, see generally Linder, supra note 66.
76 Smith, 443 U.S. at 102.
77 Id. at 105. Although the Court recognized the state's interest, it was not convinced that criminal sanctions were necessary to accomplish this goal. Id. The
Court stated that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order." Id. at 103. The Smith Court relied principally on the same three cases as the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals: Landmark Communications v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978), Cox Broadcasting v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), and
Oklahoma Publishing v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). Smith, 443 U.S. at 10203. Unlike the lower court, however, the Supreme Court considered prior restraint
to be a peripheral issue, stating that: "First Amendment protection reaches beyond
prior restraints." Id. Specifically, the Court stated:
Whether we view the statute as prior restraint or as a penal sanction
for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information is not dispositive because even the latter action requires the highest form of state
interest to sustain its validity. Prior restraints have been accorded the
most exacting scrutiny in previous cases.
Id. at 101-02; see also Linder, supra note 66, at 433 (demonstrating how Cox, Smith,
and Landmark, each applying a different test, allowed the press to publish truthful
information).
In addition, the Court noted that it did not matter whether the press obtained
information from the government or through its own diligence. Smith, 443 U.S. at
103.
78 Some of the underlying reasons presented by the State supporting confidentiality included discouraging additional anti-social behavior and protecting the juvenile's future employment and other opportunities. Id. at 104. See also, Victor L.
Streib, From Gault to Fare and Smith: The Decline in Supreme Court Reliance on Delinquency Theory, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 801 (1980) (discussing the Court's reliance on juvenile delinquency research in asserting the need for confidentiality).
79 Smith, 443 U.S. at 104-05. Relying on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974),
the Court in Smith placed the First Amendment on a par with the Sixth Amendment
when weighed against the state's interest in protecting a juvenile offender's anonymity. Smith, 443 U.S. at 104. In both cases, the Court "refused to punish the
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tives other than criminal sanctions could effectuate the goal of
confidentiality.80 The Court therefore declared the West Virginia statute unconstitutional.8

Most recently, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,82 the Court
deemed a state law, which was aimed at preventing the intentional infliction of emotional distress, to violate the press's First
Amendment rights.83 Hustler involved the publication of an advertisement parody featuring Jerry Falwell, a nationally known
truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a
newspaper" for the sake of preserving anonymity. Id. at 105-06.
80 Id. at 105.
81 Id. at 106. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, in his concurrence, carefully balanced the
two competing interests, and gave more weight to the state's confidentiality concerns than did the majority. Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that although freedom of the press "is indispensable to a
free society," it is not an absolute guarantee. Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). ChiefJustice Rehnquist further stated his conviction that "a State's interest in
preserving the anonymity of its juvenile offenders - an interest.., of the 'highest
order' - far outweighs any minimal interference with freedom of the press that a
ban on publication of the youths' names entails." Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The concurring ChiefJustice viewed the state's interest as only minimally
infringing on the press's freedoms. Id. at 108 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The
Chief Justice continued "that a generally effective ban on publication that applied
to all forms of mass communication, electronic and print media alike, would be
constitutional." Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). In the present case, however, the Chief Justice pointed out that West Virginia's statute was underinclusive
in singling out the press, and therefore, failed to accomplish its stated purpose. Id.
82 485 U.S 46 (1988).
83 Id. at 50. For a discussion on the conflict between the right of privacy and the
First Amendment rights, see Marc A. Franklin, A ConstitutionalProblem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 148 (1963) (encouraging greater professional conduct and more self-regulation among the media as
one possible solution to the dilemma). For further commentary on Hustler, see
Marc W. Boatwright, Constitutional Law: Free Speech and Emotional Distress-Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S.Ct. 876 (1988), 11 HARV.J.L. & PUB. Pol'Y 843, 848-49
(1988) (disagreeing with the Court's mechanical application of the actual malice
standard to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress while suggesting a
different, more flexible approach would have been more appropriate); Arlen W.
Langvardt, Stopping the End-Run by Public Plaintiffs: Falwell and the Refortification of
Defamation Law's ConstitutionalAspects, 26 AM. Bus. LJ. 665, 669 (1989) (commending the Court for not succumbing to back-door approaches taken by public plaintiffs, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, in their attempts to
sue the media when they would not have been able to establish the "actual malice"
necessary to sustain a defamation suit); Alicia J. Bentley, Comment, Hustler v.
Falwell: The Application of the Actual Malice Standard to IntentionalInfliction of Emotional
Distress Claims, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 828-38 (1988) (comparing the relationship
between defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims); James
R. Laguzza, Note, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell: Laugh or Cry, Public FiguresMust
Learn to Live With SatiricalCriticism, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 97, 109-11 (1988) (applauding
the Court for applying objective actual malice standard to an intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim against the media, as opposed to the subjective "outrageousness" standard traditionally applied in emotional distress cases).
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preacher with outspoken political views.8 4 The alleged libelous
advertisement for Compari Liqueur suggested that the plaintiff's
first sexual experience was with his mother.8 5
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, weighed the
press's First Amendment interests against the state's interest in
protecting individuals from the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.16 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the latter as a legitimate interest germane to other areas of the law, the
Court held that it could not be asserted to curtail political debate
on public figures.8 7 Recognizing that First Amendment rights required breathing space, the Court concluded that an actual malice standard applied to cases of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.8 8 In the present case, the Court noted that the claim
84 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 47-48. The bottom of the advertisement contained the
following disclaimer: "ad parody - not to be taken seriously." Id. at 48. The Court
found the plaintiff had not met his burden of proof, requiring a public figure to
show a false statement was made with actual malice. Id. at 56-57. The Court found
that the publication did not describe actual facts that were "reasonably believable"
to the public. Id. at 57. Falwell instituted suit based on invasion of privacy, libel
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 47-48. The jury awarded
$200,000 in actual and punitive damages based solely on the claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Falwell v. Hustler Magazine, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273
(4th Cir. 1986). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1278.
Initially, the court of appeals recognized that the defendant was entitled to the
same level of First Amendment protection in a case for intentional infliction of
emotional distress as in the New York Times defamation action because the plaintiff
was a public figure. Id. at 1274. The court, however, disagreed with a literal and
mechanical application of the actual malice standard to an action for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. The court was satisfied that the elements of
establishing plaintiff's claim had been met. Id. at 1277. Specifically, the defendant's
conduct was intentional or reckless, offended generally accepted decency and morality standards, and caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. Id. at 1275 n.4.
The court noted that under Virginia law, proof of "knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth" was not required to sustain a successful intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim. Id. at 1275. The court was unwilling to impose such a
requirement. Id.
The appellate court upheld the district court's dismissal of Falwell's invasion of
privacy claim because Falwell's name and likeness had not been used "for purposes
of trade" as required by Virginia law. Id. at 1278. The court also affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's libel claim because "no reasonable man would
believe that the parody was describing actual facts about Falwell." Id. at 1273.
85 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.
86 Id. at 50.
87 Id. at 53. The Court noted that this is especially true when no false statements of actual fact were at issue. Id. at 56.
88 Id. at 56. The First Amendment, reasoned the Court, encourages open political debate. Id. at 51. As a result, the Court stated: "public figures as well as public
officials will be subject to 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks.' " Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
The Court, in such an atmosphere, posited that false statements are an inevitable
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was based on a caricature and contained no false statements of
actual fact. 89 Consequently, the Court reversed the court of appeals decision that had awarded the plaintiff damages for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 90
It is against this background that the United States Supreme
Court decided Cohen v. Cowles Media Company.9 ' Justice White,
writing for a divided Court, began his analysis by addressing
whether sufficient state action was present under the Fourteenth
Amendment to implicate First Amendment protection.92 The
Court opined that the enforcement of state laws in a state court
and necessary element in preserving "breathing space for free expression" and are
therefore not punishable absent a showing "that the statement was made with the
requisite level of culpability." Id. at 52. Actual malice, as articulated by the Court in
New York Times v. Sullivan, requires that a statement be made "with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York
Times, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The subject of the New York Times case centered
around a partly-true, partly-false published advertisement concerning the civil racial uprisings of the South. Id. at 256-58. The plaintiff, as Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, was in charge of supervising the police and other municipal
departments. Id. at 256. Part of the advertisement contained derogatory language
about the Montgomery police department, which the plaintiff claimed indirectly accused him of" 'intimidation and violence,' " and constituted the basis of plaintiff's
defamation action. Id. at 256-58 (citation omitted). The Court, however, denied
plaintiff recovery because the statements concerned the official conduct of a public
official. Id. at 269-70.
89 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56-57. Viewing the advertisement as a cartoon, the Court
mentioned the significant role past caricatures have played in enhancing free discourse on matters of public interest. Id. at 53-55. The Court opined that the very
nature of a cartoon is satirical and deliberately distorted. Id. at 53. Specifically, the
Court articulated:
The appeal of the political cartoon or caricature is often based on
exploitation of unfortunate physical traits or politically embarrassing
events - an exploitation often calculated to injure the feelings of the
subject of the portrayal. The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided.
Id. at 54. Although the Court acknowledged that the First Amendment is not absolute, it articulated that the present cartoon did not fall within the area of unprotected speech. Id. at 56. Some of the exceptions to protected freedom of speech
include "fighting words," or vulgar, shocking and offensive speech. Id.
90 Id. at 57. Specifically, the Court stated: "We conclude that public figures and
public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress . . . without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice.' " Id. at 56. The Court accepted
the lower court's finding that the parody could not " 'reasonably be understood as
describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.' " Id. at 57 (citation omitted).
In a brief concurrence, Justice White opined that the majority's discussion of
the New York Times actual malice standard was irrelevant to the present case because
"the ad contained no assertion of fact." Id. (White, J., concurring).
91 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
92 Id. at 2517.
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constituted state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.93 Because Cohen's recovery would be based on the state
law doctrine of promissory estoppel, Justice White concluded
that the First Amendment was applicable.9 4
Having resolved the state action issue, the Court posited that
the press was subject to all laws of general applicability regardless of any incidental effects such laws might have on the newsgathering process.9 5 The majority noted that the First
Amendment did not immunize the press from answering questions at a grand jury, 96 breaking the copyright laws 9 7 or obeying
93 Id. at 2518. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770,
777 (1986) (Pennsylvania statute, which included common law "presumption of falsity" in defamation suits thereby placing the burden of proving the truth of a defamatory statement on the defendant, constituted state action restricting freedom
of the press); NAACP v. Clairbome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 891-92 (1982)
(prohibiting nonviolent, politically motivated boycotts was a state infringement on
First Amendment freedoms); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262
(1964) (Alabama law imposing strict liability for mere publication of a libelous
statement, without having to prove falsity and malice, constituted state action restricting freedom of the press).
94 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518. Initially, jurisdiction was established by a determination that the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision was not grounded solely on
state law. Id. at 2517. The Court's reliance on federal law was evinced by the following: " '[iun this case enforcement of the promise of confidentiality under a
promissory estoppel theory would violate defendants' First Amendment rights.' "
Id. at 2517 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (1990)). In
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1978), for example, the Court determined that the Delaware Supreme Court had disposed of appellant's Fourth
Amendment claim on the merits. Id. Conversely, the Supreme Court stated that it
has jurisdiction when a state's highest court rules on the merits of a federal question. Id. Similarly, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 154, 157 (1974), an appellant accused of violating a Georgia obscenity statute did not claim constitutional
protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Nevertheless, the
Court found that the record was unequivocally clear that the Georgia Supreme
Court had based its decision in part on these federal issues, thereby establishing
United States Supreme Court jurisdiction. Id. at 156-57.
95 Cohen, I 11 S. Ct. at 2518. The Court asserted that the case was not controlled
by precedent holding that a state may not prevent the publication of lawfully obtained, truthful information without establishing an interest of the "highest order."
Id. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (Florida statute making it
unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense victim held
to be an unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment freedoms); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publishing Company, 443 U.S. 97, 103, 105, 106 (1979) (Court declared
a West Virginia statute forbidding newspapers from publishing the names ofjuvenile offenders without a court's written approval unconstitutional because the information was a matter of public record and therefore its publication was protected
under the First Amendment). For a discussion of Smith, see supra notes 74-81 and
accompanying text.
96 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing Branzburg).

1992]

NOTE

369

the National Labor Relations 9 8 or Fair Labor Standards Acts. 99
The Court determined that the enforcement of general laws
against the press was subject to no greater scrutiny than enforcement of the same laws against other organizations or persons. l0 0
Because the Minnesota promissory estoppel law was one of general applicability, Justice White reasoned that it encompassed all
Minnesota citizens, including the press.1° '
Justice White next addressed Justice Blackmun's argument
that the application of promissory estoppel doctrine would punish the press "for publishing truthful information that was lawfully obtained."' 1 2 Justice White noted that the present case
involved compensatory damages and not criminal sanctions for
publication of truthful information. 0 3 Moreover, Justice White
reasoned that the characterization of the cause of action was irrelevant when it resulted from the implementation of a generally
applicable law.'0 4 Additionally, the Court was not convinced
97 Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
For a full discussion of Zacchini, see supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
98 Id. (citing Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937)). In Associated Press,
the Court determined that the Associated Press's activities of interstate transmission and receipt of newsworthy information constituted interstate commerce,
thereby invoking the regulations of the National Labor Relations Act. Associated
Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103, 128-29 (1937).
99 Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2518 (citing Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 199 (1946)) The Court in Oklahoma Press held that the Fair Labor
Standards Act did not in any way restrain expression. Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 193 (1946). Therefore, the Court held that the press
must comply with the subpoena duces tecum issued pursuant to § 11 (a) of the Act,
permitting the inspection of its employment premises. Id. at 198-99. The Cohen
Court likewise noted that the press cannot "restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws" and "must pay non-discriminatory taxes." Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518.
See also Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 134-35, 140 (1969)
(Court ruled that the defendant newspapers' practices of price-fixing, profit pooling, and market control, violated the Sherman Act and Clayton Act.).
100 Cohen, I llS. Ct. at 2518.
101 Id. at 2518-19. The Court explained that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
applied to all citizens in Minnesota and did not discriminate against the press in any
way. Id. Cf.Minneapolis Star and Tribune v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 579 (1983) (ruling that laws which single out the press are unconstitutional, thereby invalidating the State's use-tax on the ink and paper used in the
publication process); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936)
(striking down a license tax levied against certain newspapers with a specified circulation level).
102 Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2519. For a full discussion ofJustice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, see infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
103 Id. Criminal sanctions were at issue in Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524
(1989) and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing, 443 U.S. 97 (1979). Id.
104 Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2519. Justice White distinguished the present case from
Florida Star and Smith, noting that in the latter two cases, the State imposed liability
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that, in the present case, the information was lawfully obtained. 05 Justice White noted that the information was
acquired
0 6
by making, then subsequently, breaking a promise.
Furthermore, Justice White noted that Cohen was not attempting to utilize a promissory estoppel claim to circumvent the
strict requirements of a libel action.' 0 7 Thus, the majority distinguished the present circumstances from the Hustler libel suit for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 0 8 By contrast,
Cohen sought compensatory damages for the loss of his job, not
for injury to his state of mind or reputation. 109 Finally, the Court
concluded that the restraint on truthful reporting would be a
constitutionally insignificant and incidental consequence of applying a general law to the press." 0
In dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for exclusively relying on the press's liability for violations of generally
applicable laws.1' Instead, Justice Blackmun contested that the
Court should have focused on the speech's content, not the
speaker's identity." 2 The Justice opined that both media and
non-media persons should be allowed to disclose Cohen's identity, because this case involved truthful information used in the
context of a political campaign.' 1 3 Moreover, Justice Blackmun
based on speech content. Id. By contrast, in the present case, the restrictions on
publication were self-imposed by the parties to the action. Id.
105
106

Id.
Id.

107 Id. The Court noted that since the information was true, defamation law did
not apply. Id.

108 Id.
109 Id.
10 Id. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court
was reversed and remanded for a determination of damages consistent with Minnesota state law and the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 2520. The Court was unwilling to reinstate the jury's $200,000 compensatory damages award because the
"Minnesota Supreme Court's incorrect conclusion that the First Amendment
barred Cohen's claim may well have truncated its consideration of whether a promissory estoppel claim had otherwise been established under Minnesota law and
whether Cohen's jury verdict could be upheld on a promissory estoppel basis." Id.
at 2519-20.
111 Id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Justice, however, agreed with the
majority that federal jurisdiction was established and that state action was involved,
implicating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.

112

Id.

Id. Justice Blackmun observed that political speech was at the heart of the
First Amendment protection. Id. Justice Blackmun relied on aspects of New York
Times where the Court stated:
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public
questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by
our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, 'was fash113
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stated that the Court's reliance on the press's liability under generally applicable laws and supporting case law was misplaced besources did not address liability based on speech
cause those
4
1
content."
Instead, Justice Blackmun relied primarily on the Court's
reasoning in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell to contend that generally-applicable laws should not compromise free speech. 1 5 In
Hustler, although the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress was unrelated to speech restraint, that generally-applica16
ble law was subject to First Amendment principles."
Finally, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the Minnesota
promissory estoppel law did not merely have an incidental burden on speech because the publication of speech itself was the
violation." 7 Thus, reasoned Justice Blackmun, the law may not
be enforced to suppress truthful speech absent a state interest of
the "highest order."" 8 Because the state's interest in enforcing
ioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes desired by the people'. .. . The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to
the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931)).
114 Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2520-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See, e.g., cases upon
which the majority relied: Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that
the press must respond to grand jury subpoenas); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131, 134-35 (1969) (press's practices of profit-pooling and pricefixing held violative of Sherman and Clayton Acts); Associated Press v. United
States, 394 U.S. 1, 4 (1945) (declaring that Associated Press by-laws violated the
Sherman Act by requiring all Associated Press members to keep news within its
association and granting members the power to block membership to competitors);
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103, 128-29 (1937)
(press's interstate transmission of news subject to the National Labor Relations
Act).
15 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2521 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116 Id. Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's distinction of Hustler based
"on the ground that there the plaintiff sought damages for injury to his state of
mind whereas the petitioner here sought damages 'for a breach of a promise that
caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning capacity.' " Id. at 2521 n.3.
Instead, Justice Blackmun perceived both cases as similarly involving attempts to
restrain speech publication. Id. For a discussion of Hustler, see supra notes 82-90
and accompanying text.
117 Id. at 2521-22 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 2522 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979)). For a discussion of Smith, see supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun agreed with the Minnesota Supreme Court's
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promissory estoppel claims was not of the highest order, Justice
Blackmun argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision
should have been affirmed." 9
In a separate dissent, Justice Souter opined that a law's general applicability was not dispositive in determining whether it
may infringe First Amendment protections. 12 Rather, the Justice proposed the application of a balancing test in all cases
where possible restrictions of First Amendment guarantees may
result, including those that involved generally-applicable laws.12
Justice Souter stressed that abandoning this balancing test was
not justified simply because the newspapers in question voluntarily promised confidentiality. 22 Indeed, the Justice emphasized
that First Amendment protection did not solely belong to the
speaker but extended to the public, who may benefit from the
speech as well.' 23 Therefore, the Justice articulated that the public's right to access4 information, not the press's right to report it,
2
was paramount. 1

Applying this analysis to Cohen's suit against Cowles Media,
conclusion that a promissory estoppel cause of action regarding confidentiality
agreements did not outweigh First Amendment considerations. Cohen, I1I S. Ct. at
2521-22; Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990).
119 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2522 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter distinguished the cases relied on by
the majority because they involved commercial activities and relationships and did
not bear on the speech content. Id. For a discussion of the cases distinguished by
Justice Souter, see supra note 114.
121 Id. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (Court used
balancing test to weigh individual's recovery for tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress versus the freedom of the press); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting, 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977) (state interest in protecting the right of
publicity was balanced against the television station's First Amendment freedoms).
For a full discussion of Hustler, see supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text. For a
full discussion of Zacchini, see supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
122 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2522-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting). "'[T]he First Amendment goes beyond
protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw.' " Id. (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978)). The Justice also stated that the newspapers' actions were not sufficient to
constitute waiver. Id. See Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967)
(Court pointed out that, when dealing with a "valued freedom [of expression or
press], we are unwilling to find waiver in circumstances which fall short of being
clear and compelling.").
124 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2523 (Souter,J., dissenting) (citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453
U.S. 367, 395 (1981)). Justice Souter stated: " '[w]ithout the information provided
by the press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote
intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally.'" Id. (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975)).
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Justice Souter considered the release of Cohen's identity vital information which reflected on both his character and the character
of the candidate for whom he was employed.' 25 Justice Souter
argued that it was in the public's best interest for such information to be revealed because such information26may have had a
substantial impact on the election's outcome.'
Justice Souter concluded that the breach of a confidentiality
promise may give rise to liability in certain circumstances.' 2 7 For
example, Justice Souter pointed out that a private individual may
be able to recover because his identity is not of public concern. 28
Additionally, the Justice stated that the means by which confidential information was obtained was also relevant. 1 9 Viewing the
facts in Cohen's case, however, the Justice reasoned that allowing
free and open debate on matters of public concern outweighed
the state's interest in enforcing a confidentiality promise. 130
The Cohen majority did not engage in a balancing test to
reach its decision. Instead, the Court embraced the view that the
press did not occupy a special position in society. 13 1 Consistent
with the majority's opinion, there are several justifications for
subjecting the press to laws of general applicability. First, the
underlying policy reason is that the press is not above the law.
Rather, the press, just as any other citizen or institution, must
answer to the law.'3 2 In Cohen, the parties agreed there was a
125 Id. Justice Souter reasoned that such information should be accorded the
highest level of First Amendment protection. Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. For instance, the Justice stated that a private individual would have a better chance of recovering damages. Id.
131 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19. The Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), utilized similar reasoning. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment did not excuse one from the duty to obey " 'valid and neutral law[s] of
general applicability.' " Id. at 1600. The Supreme Court held that sacramental peyote use, in violation of ORE. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987), was not protected by
the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 1606.
132 See Bruce Fein & William B. Reynolds, High Court to Puzzle Press'Broken Promise,
N.J.L.J.,Jan. 3, 1991, at 14, col.4. ("[The] application of federal and state.., laws,
or other forms of economic regulation, does not depend on a constitutional balancing act that weighs their chilling impact on press activities."); Peterson v. Idaho
First National Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 286, 290 (Idaho 1961) (bank was liable for
breach of implied contract, for disclosing the plaintiff's personal bank account
records to plaintiff's employer, without consent); Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824,
831 (Ala. 1974) (that an implied contract arises out of the facts showing a mutual
intent of the parties to be bound, as determined by ordinary course of dealings and
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contract. Surely no court would allow the press to breach other
types of contracts (e.g., a sales contract, or a contract with a syn-

dicated columnist).'
Thus, the Court's decision provides
consistency.
The majority's decision also prevents the press from subscribing to a double standard. For example, the press has, on
countless occasions, vehemently defended against the required
disclosure of confidential sources. 3 4 Indeed, reporters have
gone to jail to maintain their sources' confidentiality. 3 5 Therefore, given the press's firm position in prior cases involving confidential sources,
the press's voluntary breach in Cohen was
36
inexcusable.

Second, the majority's decision is valid when one considers
the press's role in society. One of the Free Speech Clause's underlying purposes is to create an informed citizenry and another
is to encourage public participation in the government's decision-making process. 3 7 The press has frequently pointed out
the dangers of revealing confidential sources.' 3 8 The press's volcommon sense); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670-71, 675 (N.Y. 1977) (a psychiatrist was liable for publishing confidential accounts of therapy sessions with the
plaintiff; the psychiatrist's First Amendment privilege claim, based on the scientific
value of the information, was denied).
133 See Fein & Reynolds, supra note 132, at 14, col. 3-4 ("The press enjoys no
special First Amendment immunity from suits for breach of ordinary commercial
contracts for goods and services.").
134 Id. As one commentator noted: "Minnesota has a shield law protecting confidential sources specifically to promote the free flow of information to the media.
Enforcement, not abrogation, of reporters' non-disclosure commitments furthers
that objective." Id.
135 See supra note 29. In such instances, the press asserted a qualified privilege,
and conditioned disclosure on the key elements of a compelling state interest in the
need for the information and the absence of alternative means of obtaining the
information. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716-17 (3d Cir. 1979). Clearly,
had the press applied this simple test to the editorial decision in Cohen, Cohen's
name should not have been published.
136 See Emerson, supra note 2, at 888 (observing that it is common for groups to
insist on particular rights for themselves and yet demand they be denied to others).
137 See supra note 2 (noting the importance of the press in a democratic system).
138 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. For example, the chilling effect, also
termed the drying-up of sources, has been described as the withdrawal of sources
from the market for fear of identification. Paul L. Glenchur, Comment, Source Disclosure in PublicFigure Defamation Actions: Towards GreaterFirstAmendment Protection, 33
HASTINGS L.J. 623, 631-33 (1982). Although the press has made this assertion, it is
not easily quantifiable. Id. at 632-33. See Blasi, supra note 4 at 239 (discussing a
study regarding the concept of the drying up of information sources due to forced
disclosure of confidential sources). The possibility of self-censorship has also been
raised as a potential danger. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 367 U.S. 254,
279 (1964); CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 453 U.S. 367, 39495 (1981); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989).
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untary breach of contractual obligations certainly will not contribute to the flow of information in the future, and will
ultimately inhibit free expression.
Finally, public policy considerations justify the Court's decision. The media, as an institution, has grown dramatically over
the past several decades, 3 9 thereby increasing the press's susceptibility to corruption. 14 Therefore, any privileges afforded the
press via the First Amendment must be shielded from abuse.
The judiciary must play an active role in delineating the appropriate bounds. 14 1 An important consideration in this process is
recognizing that all privileges necessarily carry with them an obligation to exercise the protected right responsibly.14 2 This is "[a]
duty widely acknowledged
but not always observed by editors
43
and publishers." 1
The press, therefore, must be held accountable for its ac44
tions. Absent accountability, social institutions cannot survive. 1
An individual needs assurance that the exercise of rights will be
protected. 145 Society must value the dignity and the worth of its
individual members before cooperation can be expected from
46
the whole. 1
The foregoing considerations notwithstanding, there is a
contrary line of case law that has established the press's preferred
position in the law to maintain the free flow of ideas. 147 Libel
law, for example, is a generally-applicable law that a public offi139 One author has termed the media the "fourth estate" (family, church, and
state being the first three). Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 117 (1985).
140 Too much power in the hands of few is always risky. As one commentator
stated: "[A]bsolute power corrupts absolutely." N.J.L.J., Oct. 14, 1982, at 18, col.
1.
141 The First Amendment is not so expansive as to override the public interest in
ensuring that a reporter is not "invading the rights of other citizens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to all other persons." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 691-92 (1972).
142 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976).
143 Id.
144 Blasi, supra note 4, at 281.
145 Emerson, supra note 2, at 894.
146 Baker, supra note 5, at 991.
147 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (public officials and public figures must prove actual malice before recovering for intentional infliction of
emotional distress from media); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964) (public official in defamation suit must prove actual malice to recover damages from media); Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1086, 1089
(9th Cir. 1970) (First Amendment provides newsmen a qualified privilege not to
testify at grand jury proceedings absent demonstration of compelling need for information); see also Nimmer, supra note 7, at 658 (favoring special rights for press
based on constitutional distinction between freedom of speech and freedom of
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cial or public figure may not enforce against the press without
also showing "actual malice."' 14 8 Another line of cases has prohibited the punishment of lawfully obtained, truthful information. 149 Prior cases have established that any laws attempting to
infringe upon First Amendment privileges of the press must be
content-neutral. 150 In Cohen, however, the effect of enforcing the
promissory-estoppel theory of contract law against the press is to
create liability based on speech content. The Court's reasoning
in Cohen could threaten to undermine all that has been accomplished in the pursuit of a free press.
The array of prior law leaves an element of unpredictability
in the area of future media litigation. Future courts will be faced
with determining whether, in a particular situation, the dissemination of information will be given preferential or equal treatment. While some commentators have encouraged the Court to
develop a uniform standard for the adjudication of First Amendment claims, 15 1 it seems unlikely that one standard could be consistently applied in all situations. Rather, it appears that the ad
hoc balancing approach is the only fair way to do justice to the
unique concerns of each case. In the area of confidentiality
agreements, however, the press is in complete control and could
abstain from such practices altogether. Conversely, reporters
could carry with them standard, written confidentiality agreements. 152 Reducing the parties' agreement to writing would prepress); Armstrong, Comment, supra note 7, at 157-58 n.2 (newsman's privilege exempts reporters from certain legal processes).
148 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
149 Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103, 105, 106 (1979) (West
Virginia statute prohibiting publication of juvenile offenders' names without court
permission held unconstitutional because information was matter of public record,
thereby qualifying for First Amendment protection); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (Florida statute making it unlawful to publish or broadcast
information identifying sexual offense victim held unconstitutional infringement of
First Amendment freedoms); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 838 (1978) (state interest in preserving reputation ofjudiciary and integrity of
courts insufficient to prevent publication of lawfully obtained, truthful information
concerning confidential judicial inquiry and review proceedings).
150 Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2520-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 450-52 (1938).
151 For a proposed standard of review for breach of confidentiality suits against
the press, see Dicke, Note, supra note 10, at 1579-88; Koepke, Comment, supra note
10, at 304-16.
152 These written contracts would be legally enforceable, in the absence of a compelling state interest which would require disclosure. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972), supra notes 31-45.
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vent ambiguity and confusion, and would aid the courts in
defining the extent of one's rights.
Elisabeth L 'Heureux

